A Note on Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Interaction in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Using a simple two-group model of the private provision of public goods, this paper investigates how endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is affected by different types and degrees of between-group interactions. We show that when between-group interactions are of the same directions and weak (strong), within-group cooperation for providing public goods will (will not) occur in each group for strategic reasons. On the other hand, when between-group interactions are of the opposite directions or unidirectional, within-group cooperation will necessarily occur. In addition, endogenous formation of cooperation is independent of absolute (individual) levels of income as well as income distribution between agents, which corresponds to an extended version of Warr's neutrality theorem. We also show whether endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is beneficial or harmful to each group crucially depends on the degree of between-group interactions. The variation in the interaction degree leads to three different types of games concerning welfare consequences: the Prisoners' Dilemma, Coordination Game, and Invisible Hand.
|Date of creation:||06 Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
- Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
- Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
- Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie, 2002.
"The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, October.
- Gary Bornstein & Uri Gneezy & Rosemarie Nagel, 1999. "The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 393, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Reuben, Ernesto & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2009.
"Everyone is a Winner: Promoting Cooperation through All-Can-Win Intergroup Competition,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4112, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Reuben, Ernesto & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2010. "Everyone is a winner: Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-35, March.
- Ernesto Reuben & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Everyone Is A Winner: Promoting Cooperation Through Non-Rival Intergroup Competition," Discussion Papers 08-26, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Torsvik, Gaute, 2005. "Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 503-515, August.
- Sandler,Todd, 1997.
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583077.
- Raechelle Mascarenhas & Todd Sandler, 2006. "Do donors cooperatively fund foreign aid?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 337-357, December.
- Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008.
"Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 133-150, March.
- Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
- Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Bolle, Friedel, 2007. "Team competition and the public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 133-139, July.
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Emerson M. S. Niou & Guofu Tan, 2005. "External Threat and Collective Action," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 519-530, July.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. "Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-96, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32045. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.