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Heuristic Schelling: economy of organized crime

  • Estrada, Fernando

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31306.

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Date of creation: 06 Jun 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31306
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  1. Daniel Mejía & Carlos Posada, . "Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth," Borradores de Economia 257, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  2. Angrist, Joshua & Kugler, Adriana, 2007. "Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia," IZA Discussion Papers 2790, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. R. K. Pachauri & Sujata Gupta, 2002. "Editorial," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(2-3), pages 127-128, September.
  4. Herschel Grossman & Daniel Mejía, 2008. "The war against drug producers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-23, January.
  5. Garfinkel, Michelle R., 2004. "Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 829-852, November.
  6. Estrada, Fernando, 2005. "Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial
    [Minimum State, control agencies and Territorial protection]
    ," MPRA Paper 20172, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Jan 2010.
  7. R. Purdy, 2002. "Editorial," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-2, March.
  8. Fernando, Estrada, 2007. "La información y el rumor en zonas de conflicto
    [The information and rumor in zones of conflict]
    ," MPRA Paper 20344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2004. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 43-68, February.
  10. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
  11. Ragnar L�fstedt, 2002. "Editorial," Journal of Risk Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 1-2, January.
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