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Agricultural Extension and Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar

  • Bellemare, Marc F.

This article tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect supervision -- conflated here into the number of visits by a technical assistant -- increase productivity in a sample of contract farming arrangements between a processing �rm and small agricultural producers in Madagascar. Production functions are estimated which treat the number of visits by a technical assistant as an input and which exploit the variation in the number of visits between the contracted crops grown on a given plot by a speci�c grower, thereby accounting for district-, grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity. Results indicate that the elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits lies between 1.3 and 1.7.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23788/1/MPRA_paper_23788.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23788.

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Date of creation: 02 Feb 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23788
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  1. Anderson, Jock R. & Feder, Gershon, 2007. "Agricultural Extension," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Elsevier.
  2. Fafchamps, Marcel & Minten, Bart, 2001. "Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 229-67, January.
  3. Moser, Christine M. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2002. "Labor, Liquidity, Learning, Conformity And Smallholder Technology Adoption: The Case Of Sri In Madagascar," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19680, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  4. Ackerberg, D.A. & Botticini, M., 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 96, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Bart Minten & Lalaina Randrianarison & Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2006. "Global Retail Chains and Poor Farmers: Evidence from Madagascar," LICOS Discussion Papers 16406, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  6. MaCurdy, Thomas E & Pencavel, John H, 1986. "Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S3-S39, June.
  7. Birkhaeuser, Dean & Evenson, Robert E & Feder, Gershon, 1991. "The Economic Impact of Agricultural Extension: A Review," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(3), pages 607-50, April.
  8. Frisvold, George B., 1994. "Does supervision matter? Some hypothesis tests using Indian farm-level data," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 217-238, April.
  9. Christopher B. Barrett & Marc F. Bellemare & Janet Y. Hou, 2010. "Reconsidering Conventional Explanations of the Inverse Productivity-Size Relationship," Working Papers 10-22, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  10. Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262062364, June.
  11. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  12. Barrett, Christopher B., 1996. "On price risk and the inverse farm size-productivity relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 193-215, December.
  13. Umali-Deininger, Dina, 1997. "Public and Private Agricultural Extension: Partners or Rivals?," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 12(2), pages 203-24, August.
  14. Moser, Christine M. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2003. "The disappointing adoption dynamics of a yield-increasing, low external-input technology: the case of SRI in Madagascar," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 1085-1100, June.
  15. Warning, Matthew & Key, Nigel, 2002. "The Social Performance and Distributional Consequences of Contract Farming: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Arachide de Bouche Program in Senegal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 255-263, February.
  16. Jock R. Anderson, 2004. "Agricultural Extension: Good Intentions and Hard Realities," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 19(1), pages 41-60.
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