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The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities: A Comment

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Listed author(s):
  • Berger, Ulrich

Abstract

In a recent article, Hahn [Hahn, S. (2008). The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. Economics Letters 99, 2, 304-306] claims to prove convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. I show here that the proof is flawed and convergence remains an open question.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20241/1/MPRA_paper_20241.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20241.

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Date of creation: 03 Sep 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20241
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Keywords: Fictitious play; Strategic complementarities; Supermodular games;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997. "Fictitious play and- no-cycling conditions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-12, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  2. Echenique, Federico, 2004. "A characterization of strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 325-347, February.
  3. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
  4. Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Complementarities and Games: New Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 4742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  6. Hahn, Sunku, 2008. "The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 304-306, May.
  7. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  8. Berger, Ulrich, 2008. "Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 292-301, November.
  9. Berger, Ulrich, 2007. "Two more classes of games with the continuous-time fictitious play property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 247-261, August.
  10. Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997. "Fictitious play and no-cycling conditions," Papers 97-12, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
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