A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness
This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.
|Date of creation:||23 Feb 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1896. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.