Strategic Information Transmission: Comment
Crawford and Sobel (1982) developed a model of strategic information transmission in which a better-informed sender sends a possibly informative signal to a decision-making receiver and studied how strategically transmitted information is related to the analogy between the two players' interests. They adopted the Bayesian Nash equilibrium as their equilibrium concept and showed that the signal by the sender, the transmitted information, is more informative in pareto-superior equilibrium when the players' interests are more analogous. Their analyses, however, are not complete in that they analyzed the model based on partial consideration of the players' behavior, mixed behavior of the sender and pure behavior of the receiver. In the present study, we attempt to complete their analyses by analyzing the model based on full consideration of the players' behavior, both pure and mixed behavior. We adopt the Nash equilibrium as our equilibrium concept and conclude that results in our complete analyses are similar to the results in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative," MPRA Paper 15443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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