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I Cannot Cheat on You after We Talk

Author

Listed:
  • Cristina Bicchieri
  • Alessandro Sontuoso

    (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This is a draft of a chapter in a planned book on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, edited by Martin Peterson, to be published by Cambridge University Press. - Experimental evidence on pre-play communication supports a “focusing function of communication” hypothesis. Relevant communication facilitates cooperative, pro-social behavior because it causes a shift in individuals’ focus towards strategies dictated by some salient social norm. After reviewing the formal foundations for a general theory of conformity to social norms, we provide an original application illustrating how a framework that allows for different conjectures about norms is able to capture the focusing function of communication and to explain experimental results.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Bicchieri & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2014. "I Cannot Cheat on You after We Talk," PPE Working Papers 0001, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  • Handle: RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0001
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    File URL: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/ppe-repec/ppc/wpaper/0001.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cristina Bicchieri, 2002. "Covenants without Swords," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 192-228, May.
    2. Sontuoso, Alessandro, 2013. "A Dynamic Model of Belief-Dependent Conformity to Social Norms," MPRA Paper 53234, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. David Sally, 1995. "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 58-92, January.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2018. "Social Norms," PPE Working Papers 0015, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Charness, Gary & Naef, Michael & Sontuoso, Alessandro, 2019. "Opportunistic conformism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 100-134.
    3. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2017. "An experimental test of reporting systems for deception," Working Papers 2017/11, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    4. Michael Naef & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2014. "Consensus vs. Conformity in Mixed-Motive Games," PPE Working Papers 0002, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Cristina Bicchieri & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2017. "Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms. The Role of Normative Expectations," PPE Working Papers 0011, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social norms; social dilemmas;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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