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When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Garapin Alexis

    (GAEL, INRA-Université Pierre Mendès France,Grenoble, France)

  • Llerena Daniel

    (GAEL, INRA-Université Pierre Mendès France,Grenoble, France)

  • Hollard Michel

    (GAEL, INRA-Université Pierre Mendès France,Grenoble, France)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the question of whether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random rematching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game (DG) and then the PD game. In the DG, they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the DG are significantly lower than those observed in the control experiment.

Suggested Citation

  • Garapin Alexis & Llerena Daniel & Hollard Michel, 2011. "When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(4), pages 409-421, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:12:y:2011:i:4:p:409-421
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00532.x
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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