Theory of Semi-Collusion in the Labor Market
We study the effects of cooperative wage setting in industries that use two different types of labor. In particular, we consider a two-stage game where firms hire non-specialized workers in a perfectly competitive labor market and specialized workers that are more productive and expensive, but whose wages can be cooperatively determined by firms. It is shown that semi-collusion leads to lower wages and employment of specialized labor, lower production levels and higher prices, due to the elimination of the business stealing effect, labor force stealing effect and as a result of a dynamic effect that is specific to semi-collusive games.
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