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Cash Poor, Perk Rich! Civil Service Compensation: Incentives, Dissatisfaction, And Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Nadeem Ul Haque

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics)

  • Durr-e-Nayab

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics)

  • Omer Siddique

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics)

  • Naseem Faraz

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics)

Abstract

The question of reforming the colonial civil service, and its linked institutions, has been on the agenda since independence. Numerous commissions and efforts have been thwarted. The popular perception remains that there has been a secular decline in civil service efficiency. Most reform efforts focus on grades, performance reviews, and structures of the civil service. The incentive structure which economists think is central to human behaviour is often left out of the reform process. Civil service payment remains mired in its colonial foundations consisting of cash compensation that has not kept pace with inflation and several allowances and physical perks such as houses and cars.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadeem Ul Haque & Durr-e-Nayab & Omer Siddique & Naseem Faraz, 2021. "Cash Poor, Perk Rich! Civil Service Compensation: Incentives, Dissatisfaction, And Costs," PIDE Research Report 2021:8, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pid:rrepot:2021:8
    as

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    File URL: https://file.pide.org.pk/pdf/reports/Civil-Service-Compensation-Report.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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