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Bureaucratic Responses

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  • Canice Prendergast

Abstract

This paper's interest is in understanding how bureaucracies should respond to their clients. I claim that because many services are not priced, the responses of bureaucracies to their clients will often be the opposite of the reactions of "normal" firms. Specifically, bureaucracies ignore the most credible complaints from clients, provide the poorest service to clients who value the service most, and require the most red tape for clients who already know their needs.

Suggested Citation

  • Canice Prendergast, 2016. "Bureaucratic Responses," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(S2), pages 183-215.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/683780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 616-636.
    3. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    4. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    5. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    6. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "Consumers and Agency Problems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 34-51, March.
    7. Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mishra, Ajit & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2016. "High-powered incentives and communication failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 51-60.

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