Consumers and Agency Problems
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andrea Prat, 2005.
"The Wrong Kind of Transparency,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, pages 862-877.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Prat, Andrea, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Prat, Andrea, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Klaus Abbink & Matthew Ellman, 2004. "The donor problem," Economics Working Papers 796, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005.
- Pinghan Liang, 2013.
"Exit and Voice: A Game-theoretic Analysis of Customer Complaint Management,"
Pacific Economic Review,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 177-207, May.
- Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Exit and voice: a game-theoretic analysis of customer complaint management," MPRA Paper 45268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 15-30.
- Canice Prendergast, 2016. "Bureaucratic Responses," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(S2), pages 183-215.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2013.
"Consumers' Complaints, the Nature of Corruption, and Social Welfare,"
47215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2013. "Consumers' Complaints, the Nature of Corruption, and Social Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 4295, CESifo Group Munich.
- O'Malley, Eoin & Scott, Susan & Sorrell, Steve, 2003. "Barriers to Energy Efficiency: Evidence from Selected Sectors," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number PRS47.
- Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016. "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers 2016/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
- Amin, Mohammad, 2008. "Competition and demographics," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4514, The World Bank.
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