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Taxation and Redistribution of Residual Income Inequality

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Mikhail Golosov

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Princeton University and NBER)

  • Pricila Maziero

    ()

    (Department of Finance, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Guido Menzio

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality caused by the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogenous workers and heterogeneous firms. The optimal redistribution can be attained using a positive unemployment benefit and an increasing and regressive labor income tax. The positive unemployment benefit serves the purpose of lowering the search risk faced by workers. The increasing and regressive labor tax serves the purpose of aligning the cost to the firm of attracting an additional applicant with the value of an application to society.

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File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/12-022.pdf
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Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 12-022.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 06 Jun 2012
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:12-022
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More information through EDIRC

Keywords: Unemployment benefit; Income tax; Search frictions; Mechanism design;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
  • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
  • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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  1. Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
  2. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-1362, December.
  3. Mathias Hungerbühler & Etienne Lehmann & Alexis Parmentier & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2006. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 743-767.
  4. Guy Laroque, 2005. "Income Maintenance and Labor Force Participation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 341-376, 03.
  5. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 118-142, February.
  6. repec:pri:indrel:dsp016h440s45s is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
  8. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2012. "On The Game‐Theoretic Foundations Of Competitive Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-21, 02.
  9. Hall, Robert & Krueger, Alan B., 2008. "Wage Formation between Newly Hired Workers and Employers: Survey Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3775, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2011. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 468-510.
  11. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
  12. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2295-2350, November.
  13. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
  14. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
  15. Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2005. "Unemployment Insurance And Experience Rating: Insurance Versus Efficiency ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1303-1319, November.
  16. Emmanuel Saez, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 205-229.
  17. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
  18. James D. Montgomery, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-179.
  19. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 996-1025, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Jian Xin Heng & Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2016. "Job Qualities, Search Unemployment, and Public Policy," Discussion Papers Series 570, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  2. Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2016. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 1225-1262.
  3. Kory Kroft & Kucko Kavan & Etienne Lehmann & Johannes Schmieder, 2015. "Optimal Income Taxation with Unemployment and Wage Responses: A Sufficient Statistics Approach," Working Papers hal-01292126, HAL.
  4. Yong Tao & Xiangjun Wu & Tao Zhou & Weibo Yan & Yanyuxiang Huang & Han Yu & Benedict Mondal & Victor M. Yakovenko, 2016. "Universal Exponential Structure of Income Inequality: Evidence from 60 Countries," Papers 1612.01624, arXiv.org.
  5. Athanasios Geromichalos, 2012. "Unemployment Insurance and Optimal Taxation in Search Models of the Labor Market," Working Papers 1218, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  6. Athanasios Geromichalos, 2015. "Unemployment Insurance and Optimal Taxation in a Search Model of the Labor Market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 365-380, April.
  7. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
  8. Jean-Baptiste Michau, 2013. "On the Provision of Insurance Against Search-Induced Wage Fluctuations," Working Papers hal-00850547, HAL.
  9. Pei, Yun & Xie, Zoe, 2016. "A Quantitative Theory of Time-Consistent Unemployment Insurance," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  10. Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, 2017. "Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search," Staff Working Papers 17-15, Bank of Canada.
  11. Jan Eeckhout, 2013. "Unemployment Risk and the Distribution of Assets," 2013 Meeting Papers 337, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  12. Pei, Yun & Xie, Zoe, 2016. "Government Commitment and Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle," MPRA Paper 76563, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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