Contracting with a quiet life manager
The aim of this paper is to analyze how employees may affect firm's corporate governance. In particular, we analyze a shareholder-manager relationship through a principal-agent framework. The manager is the agent in charge of taking decisions for firm's success. Yet, when deciding, the manager takes into account employees' preferences, i.e. the manager wants to enjoy a "quiet life". Our result highlight that having a quiet-life manager is not necessarily linked to destroy value, as suggested in recent research. It might even recover part of the efficient decisions (at a cost borne by the shareholder).
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