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Tactical Coordination in Plurality Electoral Systems

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  • David P. Myatt
  • Stephen D. Fisher

Abstract

Simple plurality election systems (commonly known as `First-Past-The-Post`) are often associated with the dominance of two political parties. Such systems tend to reward leading parties with too many seats (known as the `mechanical` effect) and provoke tactical voting, where voters switch away from trailing parties (known as the `psychological` effect). We view tactical voting as a coordination problem. A group of voters wish to prevent a win by a disliked party (such as the Conservatives in recent UK elections) and must partially coordinate behind a single challenger (such as Labour or the Liberal Democrats) in order to do this. Crucially, voters have limited information on the situation within their constituency and hence there is no common knowledge of the game being played - tactical voting is a global game. We show that in this setting, voters will only partially coordinate. Furthermore, tactical voting exhibits negative feedback - tactical voting by others reduces the incentive for an individual to vote tactically, since they become concerned that they may switch in the wrong direction. We calibrate our model, and apply it to the UK General Election of 1997. Throughout England, we find that the `mechanical` and `psychological` effects tend to offset each other: Tactical voting serves to reverse the Conservative bias that results from the geographic distribution of votes.

Suggested Citation

  • David P. Myatt & Stephen D. Fisher, 2002. "Tactical Coordination in Plurality Electoral Systems," Economics Series Working Papers 133, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:133
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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper133.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffery D. Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 495-503.
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    4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
    5. David P. Myatt & Stephen D. Fisher, 2002. "Everything is Uncertain and Uncertainty is Everything: Strategic Voting in Simple Plurality Elections," Economics Series Working Papers 115, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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    8. David P. Myatt, 2002. "Idiosyncrasy, Information and the Impact of Strategic Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 94, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lehtinen, Aki, 2008. "The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 688-704, September.
    2. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2012. "Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 681-700.
    3. Suwankiri, Benjarong & Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2016. "The welfare state and migration: A dynamic analysis of political coalitions," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 122-142.
    4. Marcelo Tyszler & Arthur Schram, 2016. "Information and strategic voting," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 360-381, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic voting; tactical voting; Duverger`s Law; plurality rule; elections;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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