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Relationships and Growth

Author

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  • Shingo Ishiguro

    () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

In this paper we present a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how different contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements endogenously emerge and are dynamically linked with the process of economic development. Formal contracts are enforced by third party institutions (courts), while relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without any third party involvement. The novel feature of our model is to demonstrate the co-evolution of these different enforcement modes and market equilibrium conditions, all of which are jointly determined. We then characterize the equilibrium paths of such dynamic processes and show the time structure of relational contracting (self-enforcing agreement) in the endogenous process of economic development. In particular we show that relational contracting fosters the emergence of the market-based economy in low development stages but its role declines as the economy grows and enters high development stages.

Suggested Citation

  • Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Relationships and Growth," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1131
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic general equilibrium; economic development; arm fs length contract; relational contract;

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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