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An empirical analysis of contracting by Chinese firms

Author

Listed:
  • Hu, Yifan
  • Qiu, Larry D.

Abstract

Why do firms use formal contracts or relational contracts with their business partners? The paper uses survey data based on a large number of Chinese firms to uncover some important factors for why and when formal contracts or relational contracts are used. This study identifies geographical location as an important factor in affecting Chinese firms' contracting decisions. We find that a firm is more likely to use formal contracts with its clients and suppliers if they are located in a city different from the firm's main business location. We also find that larger (smaller) firms tend to adopt formal (relational) contracts. However, while the number of clients has a negative impact on a firm's adoption of formal contracts with its clients, the number of suppliers has a positive impact on its adoption of formal contracts with the suppliers.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Yifan & Qiu, Larry D., 2010. "An empirical analysis of contracting by Chinese firms," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-431, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:21:y:2010:i:3:p:423-431
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    References listed on IDEAS

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