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The Incentive to Declare Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in China

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  • Junmin Wan

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

We examine the validity of a new system of taxation called lottery receipts in China theoretically and empirically. Tax collection is difficult as the government difficultly monitors the actual economic dealings. To bring out the private information on transaction known only to a seller and a buyer, the government has set up a lottery receipt system which has been tried out in many areas. If the net revenue from a lottery receipt is invested in pure public goods, the lottery receipt will been purchased even if the consumer has expected quasi-linear utility. By issuing a lottery receipt, the government may prevent tax evasion caused by conspiracies between consumers and firms and collect tax effectively. Estimation is performed based on panel data for different periods from a total of 37 districts in Beijing and Tianjin during 1998-2003. The lottery receipt experiment has significantly raised the business tax, the growths of business tax and total tax revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Junmin Wan, 2006. "The Incentive to Declare Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in China," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 06-25, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0625
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    Cited by:

    1. Carla Marchese, 2009. "Rewarding the Consumer for Curbing the Evasion of Commodity Taxes?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(4), pages 383-402, December.
    2. Miriam Bruhn & David McKenzie, 2014. "Entry Regulation and the Formalization of Microenterprises in Developing Countries," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 186-201.
    3. Carvalho, Carlos & Masini, Ricardo & Medeiros, Marcelo C., 2018. "ArCo: An artificial counterfactual approach for high-dimensional panel time-series data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 352-380.
    4. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014. "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
    5. Joana Naritomi, 2019. "Consumers as Tax Auditors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3031-3072, September.
    6. Carla Marchese, 2007. "A Chinese Recipe for Curbing the Evasion of Commodity Taxes?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 5(3), pages 38-42, October.
    7. Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2022. "Cash thresholds, cash expenditure and tax evasion," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 387-403, December.
    8. Fabbri, Marco, 2015. "Shaping tax norms through lotteries," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 8-15.
    9. repec:ces:ifodic:v:5:y:2007:i:3:p:14567334 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Carla Marchese, 2007. "A Chinese Recipe for Curbing the Evasion of Commodity Taxes?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 5(03), pages 38-42, October.
    11. World Bank, 2014. "More Jobs, Better Jobs : A Priority for Egypt," World Bank Publications - Reports 20584, The World Bank Group.
    12. Fatas, Enrique & Nosenzo, Daniele & Sefton, Martin & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2021. "A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    13. M. Martin Boyer & Philippe d'Astous, 2023. "Tax compliance and firm response to electronic sales monitoring," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1430-1468, November.
    14. Kateřina Krzikallová & Filip Tošenovský, 2020. "Is the Value Added Tax System Sustainable? The Case of the Czech and Slovak Republics," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(12), pages 1-24, June.
    15. Kent Grote & Victor Matheson, 2011. "The Economics of Lotteries: An Annotated Bibliography," Working Papers 1110, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    16. Lotta Björklund Larsen & Rubina Arakelyan & Teimuraz Gogsadze & Mariam Katsadze & Sophiko Skhirtladze & Nino Muench, 2019. "The Georgian Tax Lottery of 2012. A Multi-Methodological Assessment," Working Papers 009-19 JEL Codes: H26, K4, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
    17. Junmin Wan, 2010. "The Incentive to Declare Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in China," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(s1), pages 611-624, August.
    18. Lotta Björklund Larsen, 2023. "Game of tax: Rethinking the relationship between redistribution and reciprocity through a Georgian tax lottery," Economic Anthropology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 100-111, January.
    19. Cyril Chimilila & Remidius Ruhinduka & Vincent Leyaro, 2023. "The design and revenue impact of a tax receipts lottery: A lab experiment in Tanzania," Discussion Papers 2023-02, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    20. Wan, Junmin, 2021. "The lottery receipt," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 733-750.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; business tax; lottery receipt experiment; random trend (growth) model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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