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From "Clientelism" to a "Client-Centred Orientation"? The Challenge of Public Administration Reform in Russia

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  • William Tompson

Abstract

The inefficiency, corruption and lack of accountability that afflict public administration in Russia impose substantial direct costs on both entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens. This paper examines the major weaknesses of Russia’s public administration and assesses the government’s recently revised programme of administrative reform. It lays particular stress on the relationship between public bureaucracies and the larger institutional environment within which they operate, as well as on the need for far greater transparency of public bodies and stronger non-judicial means of redress for citizens wishing to challenge bureaucratic decisions. Many of the problems of Russia’s public administration are aggravated by the fact that the Russian state often tries to do too much: the paper therefore explores the link between administrative reform and the scope of state ownership and regulation. Du « clientélisme » à une culture administrative orientée vers le « client »? Le défi de la réforme de l'administration publique en Russie Le manque d’efficacité, la corruption et la déresponsabilisation de l’administration publique en Russie imposent un lourd fardeau à la fois aux entreprises et aux particuliers. Cette étude examine les principales faiblesses de l’administration publique russe et évalue le programme gouvernemental de réforme administrative, récemment révisé. Un accent particulier est mis sur les liens entre l’administration publique et l’environnement institutionnel dans lequel elle opère ainsi que sur la nécessité d’une bien plus grande transparence des organes publics et de voies de recours extrajudiciaires renforcées pour les citoyens contestant une décision administrative. Beaucoup des problèmes de l’administration publique russe sont aggravés par le fait que, souvent, l’État russe est enclin à trop intervenir ; pour cette raison, l’étude analyse les interactions entre la réforme administrative d’une part et l’étendue de la propriété publique et de la réglementation d’autre part.

Suggested Citation

  • William Tompson, 2007. "From "Clientelism" to a "Client-Centred Orientation"? The Challenge of Public Administration Reform in Russia," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 536, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:536-en
    DOI: 10.1787/332450142780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    accountability; administration de l’Etat; administration publique; bureaucracy; bureaucratie; civil service; corruption; corruption; entreprise d'État; fonction publique; gestion publique; médiateur; nationalisation; nationalisation; ombudsman; public administration; public management; regulation; responsabilité; régulation; state administration; state ownership; transparence; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions

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