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Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse

  • S. GURIEV
  • G. EGOROV
  • K. SONIN.

How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absence of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler’s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies, where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.

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Article provided by N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki" in its journal Voprosy Economiki.

Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:nos:voprec:2007-04-1
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.vopreco.ru/eng/year.html

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