Institutions, Social Norms and Well-being
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More about this item
KeywordsNorms; governance; well-being; public institutions; transparency;
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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