Private Sector Risk and Financial Crises in Emerging Markets

Investment necessary for growth is risky and often requires external financing. For an emerging market, access to international credit markets is volatile and interest rates reflect risk of default. We present a theoretical model in which emerging market agents have access to a profitable two-period investment project of fixed size greater than their endowment. Credit market imperfections can magnify a small solvency problem into a financial crisis with widespread default and/or currency devaluation. In equilibrium, creditors o¡èer single-period debt up to a ceiling based on expected future output. News about a negative productivity shock reduces the debt ceiling imposed by creditors, creating a sudden stop of capital floows. The sudden stop can be severe enough to trigger a debt crisis, when agents prefer default over debt repayment, and/or a currency crisis, as agents attempt to maintain desired consumption by swapping domestic currency for foreign currency to purchase goods. We also show that there are critical thresholds for parameters governing credit market imperfections that separate countries into a safe credit club with low interest rates and steady access and a risky club with high interest rates and volatile access.