A True Expert Knows which Question Should be Asked
We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is asked to make a prediction which is tested against a single realization of the stochastic process. It is shown that by asking the expert to predict a “small” set of sequences, the test will assure that any informed expert can pass the test with probability one with respect to the actual distribution. Moreover, for the uninformed non-expert it is impossible to pass this test, in the sense that for any choice of a “small” set of sequences, only a “small” set of measures will assign a positive probability to the given set. Hence for “most” measures, the non-expert will surely fail the test. We define small as category 1 sets, described in more detail in the paper.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014|
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010.
"A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
572, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999.
"A General Class of Adaptive Strategies,"
Game Theory and Information
9904001, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1995.
"Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play,"
3198694, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "The reproducible properties of correct forecasts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 151-159, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997.
"Conditional Universal Consistency,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
471, David K. Levine.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 2001. "Any Inspection Is Manipulable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1333-47, September.
- Ehud Kalai, 1995.
"Calibrated Forecasting and Merging,"
1144R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2010. "Calibrated Forecasting and Merging," Levine's Working Paper Archive 584, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Calibrated Forecasting and Merging," Discussion Papers 1144, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
- Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2004. "Belief-based equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 157-171, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1385. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.