Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game
This paper explores a model of bounded rationality in evolutionary game play in which agent choice is based on a social psychological process of categorization and social inference. The computer simulation of the model demonstrates that agents' increasing ability to categorize opponents in the chicken game affords a higher population average payoff and introduces increasing social stratification among them. Greater trait diversity and population size are shown to have a harmful effect on payoffs. A VERSION OF THIS PAPER IS FORTHCOMING IN COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS UNDER THE TITLE "THE COGNITIVE ORGINS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION".
|Date of creation:||10 Oct 2001|
|Date of revision:||10 Apr 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, Nottingham, NG8 1BB|
Phone: +44 (0) 115 84 66602
Fax: +44 (0) 115 84 66667
Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/Divisions/EconomicsFinance/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000.
"Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Oliver Kirchkamp, 1994. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9403003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 1994.
- Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "The Ecology of Cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 101-118, March.
- Robert Axtell, Joshua M. Epstein, & H. Peyton Young, . "The Emergence of Economic Classes in an Agent-based Bargaining Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 61, Society for Computational Economics.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Herbert A. Simon, 1996. "The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262691914, June.
- John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
- Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, 1985. "Effort and Accuracy in Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(4), pages 395-414, April.
- Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-71, May.
- Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nub:occpap:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Hoffmann)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Robert Hoffmann to update the entry or send us the correct email address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.