Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game
This paper explores a model of bounded rationality in evolutionary game play in which agent choice is based on a social psychological process of categorization and social inference. The computer simulation of the model demonstrates that agents' increasing ability to categorize opponents in the chicken game affords a higher population average payoff and introduces increasing social stratification among them. Greater trait diversity and population size are shown to have a harmful effect on payoffs. A VERSION OF THIS PAPER IS FORTHCOMING IN COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS UNDER THE TITLE "THE COGNITIVE ORGINS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION".
|Date of creation:||10 Oct 2001|
|Date of revision:||10 Apr 2001|
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