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Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game

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Abstract

This paper explores a model of bounded rationality in evolutionary game play in which agent choice is based on a social psychological process of categorization and social inference. The computer simulation of the model demonstrates that agents' increasing ability to categorize opponents in the chicken game affords a higher population average payoff and introduces increasing social stratification among them. Greater trait diversity and population size are shown to have a harmful effect on payoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game," Occasional Papers 1, Nottingham University Business School, revised 10 Apr 2001.
  • Handle: RePEc:nom:occasi:1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
    2. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    3. Robert Axtell, Joshua M. Epstein, & H. Peyton Young, "undated". "The Emergence of Economic Classes in an Agent-based Bargaining Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 61, Society for Computational Economics.
    4. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
    5. Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, 1985. "Effort and Accuracy in Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(4), pages 395-414, April.
    6. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    7. Jack Hirshleifer & Juan Carlos Martinez Coll, 1988. "What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(2), pages 367-398, June.
    8. Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-371, May.
    9. Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "The Ecology of Cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 101-118, March.
    10. Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
    11. Herbert A. Simon, 1996. "The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262691914, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bounded rationality; social cognition; chicken game; stereotypes; categorization; adaptive expectations; social inference; discrimination; social stratification;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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