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The lion’s share. An experimental analysis of polygamy in Northern Nigeria

  • Alistair Munro

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

  • Bereket Kebede

    (School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia)

  • Marcela Tarazona-Gomez

    (School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia)

  • Arjan Verschoor

    (School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia)

Using samples of polygamous and non-polygamous households from villages in rural areas south of Kano, Northern Nigeria we test basic theories of household behaviour. Husbands and wives play two variants of a voluntary contributions game in which endowments are private knowledge, but contributions are public. In one variant, the common pool is split equally. In the other treatment the husband allocates the pool (and wives are forewarned of this). Most partners keep back at least half of their endowment from the common pool, but we find no evidence that polygynous households are less efficient than their monogamous counterparts. We also reject a strong form of Bergstrom’s model of polygyny in which all wives receive an equal allocation. In our case, senior wives often receive more from their husbands, no matter what their contribution. Thus the return to contributions is higher for senior wives compared to their junior counterparts. When they control the allocation, polygynous men receive a higher payoff than their monogamous counterparts. We speculate on the implications of this pattern of investment and reward for the sustainability of polygynous institutions.

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Paper provided by National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in its series GRIPS Discussion Papers with number 10-27.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ngi:dpaper:10-27
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  1. Biorn, Erik, 2004. "Regression systems for unbalanced panel data: a stepwise maximum likelihood procedure," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 281-291, October.
  2. John A. Maluccio & John Hoddinott & Jere R. Behrman & Reynaldo Martorell & Agnes R. Quisumbing & Aryeh D. Stein, 2009. "The Impact of Improving Nutrition During Early Childhood on Education among Guatemalan Adults," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 734-763, 04.
  3. Eric D. Gould & Omer Moav & Avi Simhon, 2008. "The Mystery of Monogamy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 333-57, March.
  4. Kuhn, Peter & Robert, Jacques, 1989. "Seniority and Distribution in a Two-Worker Trade Union," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 485-505, August.
  5. Kazianga, Harounan & Klonner, Stefan, 2009. "The Intra-household Economics of Polygyny: Fertility and Child Mortality in Rural Mali," MPRA Paper 12859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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