The Legacy of Deposit Insurance: The Growth, Spread, and Cost of Insuring Financial Intermediaries
Without the Great Depression, the United States would not have adopted deposit insurance. While the New Deal's anti-competitive barriers have largely collapsed become" deeply rooted. This paper examines how market and political competition for deposits raised the level of coverage and spread insurance to all depository institutions. A comparison of the cost of federal insurance with a counterfactual of an insurance-free system shows that federal insurance ultimately imposed a" higher cost but achieved political acceptance because of the distribution of the burden.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as White, Eugene N. "The Legacy of Deposit Insurance: The Growth, Spread, and Cost of Insuring Financial Intermediaries". The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Michael D. Bordo, Claudia Golden, and Eugene N.White, Chicago: The Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1998, pp.87-121.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hoekman, Bernard M. & Leidy, Michael P., 1992. "Cascading contingent protection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 883-892, May.
- Friedman, Milton & Schwartz, Anna J., 1986.
"Has government any role in money?,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 37-62, January.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Seth Kaplan, 1993. "Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 150-58, February.
- Grossman, Richard S, 1992. "Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 800-821, September.
- Elijah Brewer Iii & Thomas H. Mondschean, 1993. "Life Insurance Company Risk Exposure: Market Evidence And Policy Implications," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 11(4), pages 56-69, October.
- Wheelock, David C, 1992. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Failures: New Evidence from the 1920s," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 530-43, July.
- Arthur B. Kennickell & Myron L. Kwast & Martha Starr-McCluer, 1995.
"Households' deposit insurance coverage: evidence and analysis of potential reforms,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
95-5, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Kennickell, Arthur B & Kwast, Myron L & Starr-McCluer, Martha, 1996. "Households' Deposit Insurance Coverage: Evidence and Analysis of Potential Reforms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(3), pages 311-22, August.
- White, Lawrence J, 1989.
"The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 11-29, Fall.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6063. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.