IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25252.html

Reputation Cycles and Earnings Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Boyan Jovanovic
  • Julien Prat

Abstract

Cyclical patterns in earnings can arise when contracts between firms and their workers are incomplete, and when workers cannot borrow or lend so as to smooth their consumption. Earnings cycles generate occasional large changes in earnings, consistent with some recent empirical findings. At the calibrated parameter values, financial constraints promote investment in reputation – an intangible capital form – in contrast to their documented inhibiting effect on investment in tangible capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyan Jovanovic & Julien Prat, 2018. "Reputation Cycles and Earnings Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 25252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25252
    Note: PR
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w25252.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joachim Hubmer, 2018. "The Job Ladder and its Implications for Earnings Risk," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 29, pages 172-194, July.
    2. Gueorgui Kambourov & Iourii Manovskii, 2008. "Rising Occupational And Industry Mobility In The United States: 1968-97," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(1), pages 41-79, February.
    3. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jovanovic, Boyan & Prat, Julien, 2021. "Reputation and earnings dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    2. Carlos Carrillo-Tudela & Ludo Visschers & David Wiczer, 2022. "Cyclical Earnings, Career and Employment Transitions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9990, CESifo.
    3. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
    4. Federico Di Pace & Matthias Hertweck, 2019. "Labor Market Frictions, Monetary Policy, and Durable Goods," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 32, pages 274-304, April.
    5. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    6. Battisti, Michele & Gatto, Massimo Del & Parmeter, Christopher F., 2022. "Skill-biased technical change and labor market inefficiency," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    7. Tschopp, Jeanne, 2015. "The Wage Response to Shocks: The Role of Inter-Occupational Labour Adjustment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 28-37.
    8. , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    9. Henry Hyatt & Erika McEntarfer & Ken Ueda & Alexandria Zhang, 2016. "Interstate Migration and Employer-to-Employer Transitions in the U.S.: New Evidence from Administrative Records Data," Working Papers 16-44, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    10. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2012. "Communication and Learning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 419-450.
    11. Do, Jihwan & Miklós-Thal, Jeanine, 2023. "Partial secrecy in vertical contracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    12. Kaas, Leo & Lalé, Etienne & Siassi, Nawid, 2023. "Job Ladder and Wealth Dynamics in General Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 18706, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Jayakumar Subramanian & Amit Sinha & Aditya Mahajan, 2023. "Robustness and Sample Complexity of Model-Based MARL for General-Sum Markov Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 56-88, March.
    14. Hart, Sergiu & Rinott, Yosef, 2020. "Posterior probabilities: Dominance and optimism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    15. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo.
    16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11236 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2015. "History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(2), pages 423-456.
    18. Chatterjee, Satyajit & Corbae, Dean & Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor, 2008. "A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 149-177, September.
    19. Theodore Papageorgiou, 2022. "Occupational Matching and Cities," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 82-132, July.
    20. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2025. "To discriminate or not to discriminate: how to enforce unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 146(2), pages 237-262, October.
    21. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Manzoni, Elena & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2019. "Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 341-360.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.