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Accounting for the Rise in C-sections: Evidence from Population Level Data

Author

Listed:
  • Sara Allin
  • Michael Baker
  • Maripier Isabelle
  • Mark Stabile

Abstract

Drawing on administrative records of nearly 4 million births in Canada as well as macro data from the US and Australia, we provide a comprehensive account of rising C-section rates. We explicitly consider the contributions of the changing characteristics of mothers, births, and physicians as well as changing financial incentives for C-section deliveries. These factors account for at most one-half of the increase in C-section rates. The majority of the remaining increase in C-sections over the period 1994-2011 occurred in the early 2000s. We overview the relative contributions that the Hannah Breech Trial and technological change may have played in this development.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Allin & Michael Baker & Maripier Isabelle & Mark Stabile, 2015. "Accounting for the Rise in C-sections: Evidence from Population Level Data," NBER Working Papers 21022, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Lefevre, M., 2014. "Physician induced demand for C-sections: does the convenience incentive matter?," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 14/08, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Diane Alexander, 2013. "Does Physician Compensation Impact Procedure Choice and Patient Health?," Working Papers 1475, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Health and Wellbeing..
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    Cited by:

    1. de Elejalde, Ramiro & Giolito, Eugenio, 2019. "More Hospital Choices, More C-Sections: Evidence from Chile," IZA Discussion Papers 12297, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Berta, P.; & Martini, G.; & Piacenza, M.; & Turati, G.;, 2019. "The strange case of appropriate C-sections:DRG-tariff regulation, hospital ownership, and market concentration," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 19/02, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Aleksandr Proshin & Alexandre Cazenave-Lacroutz & Zeynep Or & Lise Rochaix, 2018. "Impact of Diagnosis Related Group Refinement on the Choice Between Scheduled Caesarean Section and Normal Delivery: Recent Evidence from France," Working Papers halshs-01812107, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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