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Low Staffing in the Maternity Ward: Keep Calm and Call the Surgeon

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  • Gabriel A. Facchini Palma

    (Department of Applied Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain)

Abstract

This paper examines how workload affects the provision of care in a large but understudied segment of the healthcare sector – maternity wards. I use detailed patient-level administrative data on childbirth, and exploit quasi-random assignment of unscheduled patients to different staffing ratios. I find that patients who at admission observe a higher ratio of patients-to-midwives are more likely to receive a C-section. I show that this result is not attributable to patients’ differential sorting across workload levels. Instead, I find evidence that C-sections are used to alleviate midwives’ workload -they are faster than vaginal births and performed by physicians. I also exploit patient’s civil status to determine whether the effect varies with patient’s bargaining power -single women are on average more likely to be alone in the delivery room. Consistent with induced demand, only single patients are more likely to receive a C-section when admitted at high workload levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel A. Facchini Palma, 2020. "Low Staffing in the Maternity Ward: Keep Calm and Call the Surgeon," Working Papers wpdea2009, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
  • Handle: RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Facchini, 2022. "Forgetting‐by‐not‐doing: The case of surgeons and cesarean sections," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(3), pages 481-495, March.
    2. de Elejalde, Ramiro & Giolito, Eugenio, 2019. "More Hospital Choices, More C-Sections: Evidence from Chile," IZA Discussion Papers 12297, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Bhalotra, Sonia R. & Nunes, Letícia & Rocha, Rudi, 2020. "Urgent Care Centers, Hospital Performance and Population Health," IZA Discussion Papers 13992, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Simon Bensnes, 2021. "Time to spare and too much care. Congestion and overtreatment at the maternity ward," Discussion Papers 963, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    5. de Elejalde, Ramiro & Giolito, Eugenio, 2021. "A demand-smoothing incentive for cesarean deliveries," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cesarean section; workload; midwives; physician induced demand; bargaining power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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