Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Delivery: New Conclusions from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
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- Grant, Darren, 2009. "Physician financial incentives and cesarean delivery: New conclusions from the healthcare cost and utilization project," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 244-250, January.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Gruber, Jon & Kim, John & Mayzlin, Dina, 1999. "Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 473-490, August.
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