Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth and Politics in New York, 1791-1826
This paper analyzes the early history of corporate shareholding, and its relationship with political change. In the late eighteenth century, corporations were extremely rare and were dominated by elites, but in the early nineteenth century, after American politics became significantly more democratic, corporations proliferated rapidly. Using newly collected data, this paper compares the wealth and status of New York City households who owned corporate stock to the general population there both in 1791, when there were only two corporations in the state, and in 1826, when there were hundreds. The results indicate that although corporate stock was held principally by the city's elite merchants in both periods, share ownership became more widespread over time among less affluent households. In particular, the corporations created in the 1820s were owned and managed by investors who were less wealthy than the stockholders of corporations created in earlier, less democratic periods in the state's history.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Hilt, Eric & Valentine, Jacqueline, 2012. "Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and Politics in New York, 1791–1826," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(02), pages 332-363, June.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rousseau, Peter L., 2009. "Share liquidity, participation, and growth of the Boston market for industrial equities, 1854-1897," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 203-219, April.
- Huberman, Gur, 2001. "Familiarity Breeds Investment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(3), pages 659-80.
- Hilt, Eric & O'Banion, Katharine, 2009. "The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822–1858: Partnerships Without Kinship," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(03), pages 615-645, September.
- Klein, Daniel & Majewski, John, 1991. "Economy, Community and Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York, 1797-1845," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt61b022cr, University of California Transportation Center.
- Bodenhorn, Howard, 2008.
"Free banking and bank entry in nineteenth-century New York,"
Financial History Review,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(02), pages 175-201, October.
- Howard Bodenhorn, 2004. "Free Banking and Bank Entry in Nineteenth-Century New York," NBER Working Papers 10654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hilt, Eric, 2008.
"When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century,"
The Journal of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(03), pages 645-685, September.
- Eric Hilt, 2007. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," NBER Working Papers 13093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Musacchio,Aldo, 2015.
"Experiments in Financial Democracy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107514782.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.