Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information
This paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage. Under specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover. In addition, aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs.These results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity, long-term contracting, or aggregate price misperceptions.
|Date of creation:||May 1984|
|Publication status:||published as Perry, Motty and Gary Solon. "Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, October 1985, pp. 421-433.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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