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Trade unions, employee share ownership and wage setting: A supply-side approach to the share economy

Author

Listed:
  • Renström, Thomas I.
  • Roszbach, Kasper

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Employee share ownership is growing increasingly important. This paper studies employee share ownership in an economy with one monopoly union for each firm. We modify an implicit contra t model by adding dividend income to the usual wage income. Union members differ in exogenous stock endowments and choose wages under majority rule. As a result, wages are decreasing in stock endowments and a skewed distribution of stoc k-capital leads to higher wages and lower employment. Switching to a more equal distribution can increase employment and production. An optimal portfolio rule suggests that macroeconomic gains can be made from limiting the diversification of portfolios. Last, we show how the transfer of shares to employees can be made economically feasible.

Suggested Citation

  • Renström, Thomas I. & Roszbach, Kasper, 1995. "Trade unions, employee share ownership and wage setting: A supply-side approach to the share economy," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 65, Stockholm School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0065
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M, 1983. "Union Wages, Temporary Layoffs, and Seniority," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 277-290, June.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-307, May.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    5. Douglas H. Blair & David L. Crawford, 1984. "Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(3), pages 547-566.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jukka Lassila, 2000. "Wage formation by majority voting and the incentive effects of pensions and taxation," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 89-115, Autumn.
    2. Barbara Pfeffer, 2006. "Trade Policy and Risk Diversification," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 126-06, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    3. Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erdal, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Industrial Organization 0204001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Lassila, Jukka, 2002. "Wage Formation by Majority Voting and the Incentive Effects of Pensions and Taxation," Discussion Papers 636, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    6. Lassila, Jukka, . "Essays on Taxes and Wage Formation," ETLA A, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, number 32.
    7. Harms, Philipp & Hefeker, Carsten, 2003. "Globalization and unemployment: the role of international diversification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 281-286, February.
    8. Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, "undated". "Endogeneous Firm Objectives," Wallis Working Papers WP27, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade unions; profit sharing; distribuion; voting; portfolio choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

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