Trade unions, employee share ownership and wage setting: A supply-side approach to the share economy
Employee share ownership is growing increasingly important. This paper studies employee share ownership in an economy with one monopoly union for each firm. We modify an implicit contra t model by adding dividend income to the usual wage income. Union members differ in exogenous stock endowments and choose wages under majority rule. As a result, wages are decreasing in stock endowments and a skewed distribution of stoc k-capital leads to higher wages and lower employment. Switching to a more equal distribution can increase employment and production. An optimal portfolio rule suggests that macroeconomic gains can be made from limiting the diversification of portfolios. Last, we show how the transfer of shares to employees can be made economically feasible.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden|
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- Grossman, Gene M, 1983. "Union Wages, Temporary Layoffs, and Seniority," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 277-290, June.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-307, May.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
- Douglas H. Blair & David L. Crawford, 1984. "Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 547-566.
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