Endogenous Firm Objectives
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsimperfect competition; shareholder voting;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-02-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2003-02-18 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-IND-2003-02-20 (Industrial Organization)
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