IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jeczfn/v68y1998i2p111-135.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Shareholders' choice

Author

Listed:
  • Petra Geraats
  • Hans Haller

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:68:y:1998:i:2:p:111-135
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01237187
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01237187
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Vial, Jean-Philippe, 1972. "Oligopoly "A la cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 381-400, June.
    2. Erkan YalÁin & Thomas I. Renstr–m, 2003. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, January.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
    4. Richard E. Kihlstrom & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1982. "A Competitive Entrepreneurial Model of a Stock Market," NBER Chapters,in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 141-202 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
    6. Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1057-1083, September.
    7. Bester, Helmut, 1982. "On shareholder unanimity in the mean-variance model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 363-367.
    8. Haller, Hans & Liu, Chung-Shu, 1995. "Asymptotic shareholder unanimity with exogenous noise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 69-76, January.
    9. Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
    10. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2008. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1115-1141, December.
    2. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2005. "Are incomplete markets able to achieve minimal efficiency?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(1), pages 75-87, January.
    3. Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Industrial Organization 0204001, EconWPA.
    4. Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, "undated". "Endogeneous Firm Objectives," Wallis Working Papers WP27, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    5. Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erkan, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    shareholder disagreement; shareholder voting; JEL classification; D21; G34; L21;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:68:y:1998:i:2:p:111-135. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.