IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/roc/wallis/wp27.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Endogeneous Firm Objectives

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Renstrom

    (Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester and CEPR)

  • Erkan Yalcin

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, "undated". "Endogeneous Firm Objectives," Wallis Working Papers WP27, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  • Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.wallis.rochester.edu/WallisPapers/wallis_27.pdf
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: None
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June.
    2. Dierker, Egbert & Grodal, Birgit, 1996. "Profit Maximization Mitigates Competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 139-160, January.
    3. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
    4. Roemer, John E, 1993. " Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(2), pages 227-238.
    5. Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
    6. Renström, Thomas I. & Roszbach, Kasper, 1995. "Trade unions, employee share ownership and wage setting: A supply-side approach to the share economy," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 65, Stockholm School of Economics.
    7. Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erkan, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Thomas Renstrom & Erkan Yalcin, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Industrial Organization 0204001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2008. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1115-1141, December.
    4. Erkan Yalçin & Thomas I. Renström, 2003. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, January.
    5. L. Marsiliani & X. Liu & Л. Марсилиани & К. Лю, 2017. "Структура Акционерного Капитала И Степень Эксплуатации Нефтяных Месторождений // Share-Ownership Distribution And Extraction Rate Of Petroleum In Oil Fields," Review of Business and Economics Studies // Review of Business and Economics Studies, Финансовый Университет // Financial University, vol. 5(1), pages 42-53.
    6. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2009. "Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 212-222, March.
    7. Sabarwal Tarun, 2007. "Value Maximization as an Ex-Post Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are Incomplete," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, January.
    8. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "Portfolio Diversification and Internalization of Production Externalities through Majority Voting," Working Papers hal-00587205, HAL.
    9. David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November.
    10. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Sciences Po publications 726/2001, Sciences Po.
    11. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 403-424, June.
    12. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2007. "Corporate Control and the Stock Market," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 60, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    13. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 45-75, September.
    14. CRES, Hervé & TVEDE, Mich, 2004. "The Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability," HEC Research Papers Series 794, HEC Paris.
    15. Levit, Doron & Malenko, Nadya & Maug, Ernst, 2019. "Trading and shareholder voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2010. "Theory of the firm: bargaining and competitive equilibrium," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    17. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June.
    19. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10267 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10281 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Hnatkovska, Viktoria, 2010. "Home bias and high turnover: Dynamic portfolio choice with incomplete markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 113-128, January.
    22. Hervé Crès, 2006. "A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 377-406, October.
    23. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard DiSalvo (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.