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Regulating Financial Conglomerates

Author

Listed:
  • Xavier Freixas

    () (Universitat Pompeu Fabra
    CEPR)

  • Gyongyi Loranth

    (London Business School)

  • Alan D. Morrison

    () (University of Oxford, Saïd Business School)

  • Hyun Song Shin

    () (London School of Economics
    CEPR)

Abstract

We analyse a model of financial intermediation in which intermediaries are subject to moral hazard and they do not invest socially optimally, because they ignore the systemic costs of failure and, in the case of banks, because they fail to account for risks which are assumed by the deposit insurance fund. Capital adequacy requirements are designed to minimise the social costs of these effects. We show that banks should always have higher regulatory capital requirements than insurance companies. Contrary to received wisdom, when banks and insurance companies combine to form financial conglomerates we show that it is socially optimal to separate their balance sheets. Moreover, the practice of "regulatory arbitrage", or of transfering assets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare increasing.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Freixas & Gyongyi Loranth & Alan D. Morrison & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Regulating Financial Conglomerates," Working Paper Research 54, National Bank of Belgium.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbb:reswpp:200405-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dicembrino, Claudio & Scandizzo, Pasquale Lucio, 2011. "Can portfolio diversification increase systemic risk? evidence from the U.S and European mutual funds market," MPRA Paper 33715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Nadine Gatzert & Hato Schmeiser, 2011. "On the risk situation of financial conglomerates: does diversification matter?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 25(1), pages 3-26, March.
    3. Eling, Martin & Gatzert, Nadine & Schmeiser, Hato, 2009. "Minimum standards for investment performance: A new perspective on non-life insurer solvency," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 113-122, August.
    4. Schlütter, Sebastian & Gründl, Helmut, 2011. "Who benefits from building insurance groups? A welfare analysis of optimal group capital management," ICIR Working Paper Series 08/11, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    5. Itai Agur, 2009. "Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking," DNB Working Papers 213, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, 2012. "Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 1-38, October.
    7. Olszak, Małgorzata & Pipień, Mateusz & Kowalska, Iwona & Roszkowska, Sylwia, 2014. "What drives heterogeneity of loan loss provisions’ procyclicality in the EU?," MPRA Paper 56834, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Onji, Kazuki & Vera, David & Corbett, Jenny, 2012. "Capital injection, restructuring targets and personnel management: The case of Japanese regional banks," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 495-517.
    9. Mälkönen, Ville, 2009. "Financial conglomeration and monitoring incentives," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 105-123, June.
    10. Krishnan, Karthik, 2013. "Commercial banks getting underwriting business: Tying or business building?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 47-75.
    11. Barbosa, Klenio & de Paula Rocha, Bruno & Salazar, Fernando, 2015. "Assessing competition in the banking industry: A multi-product approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 340-362.
    12. Swamy, Vighneswara, 2012. "Financial Holding Company Structure for India," MPRA Paper 47515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Nedelchev, Miroslav, 2010. "Корпоративно Управление На Финансови Групи (Спазвай И Обяснявай)
      [Corporate Governance of Financial Groups (Comply and Explain)]
      ," MPRA Paper 52249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. De Jonghe, O.G., 2009. "Back to Basics in Banking? A Micro-Analysis of Banking System Stability," Discussion Paper 2009-45 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Dietrich, Diemo & Vollmer, Uwe, 2012. "Are universal banks bad for financial stability? Germany during the world financial crisis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 123-134.
    16. Elisa Luciano & Clas Wihlborg, 2013. "Financial synergies and the Organization of Bank Affiliates; A Theoretical Perspective on Risk and Efficiency," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 322, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2014.
    17. Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, 2011. "Implicit Guarantees and Risk Taking: Evidence from Money Market Funds," NBER Working Papers 17321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Olivier De Jonghe, 2008. "The impact of revenue diversity on banking system stability," EIEF Working Papers Series 0815, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Jul 2008.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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