Financial conglomeration and monitoring incentives
If combining insurance and banking services generates scope economies in terms of monitoring the customers, competition in the financial markets becomes more intense after financial conglomeration. The pro-competitive effect reduces the prices of the financial services, increases monitoring and improves financial stability. Increased monitoring allows financial regulators apply lower capital requirements for financial conglomerates.
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