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La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne

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This paper aims to test the intrinsic motivation of licensed in-home services (LIHS) employees with an emphasis on the differences in hourly wages paid to the employees of non-profit LIHS and for-profit LIHS employees. Our approach is to test intrinsic motivation by using the “labor donation” theory of Preston (1989), depending on whether the LIHS organization is for-profit or non-profit. This theory states that employees in non-profit sectors place lower value on money and higher value on non-monetary benefits such as social responsibility. The analysis is based upon French data: DADS (official wage data) from Insee, the French National Institute of Statistics ; Dares French Labor Study data ; and Nova data from ANSP, the national agency for development of in-home services. We estimate an Endogenous Switching Model with two methods. First, we adopt the two-step Heckman approach with extended correction terms. Second, we estimate the model with the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method where we include instrumental variables for identification purposes

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  • Salah Ould Younes, 2014. "La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14055, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14055
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    1. Mathieu Narcy, 2009. "Les salariés du secteur associatif sont-ils davantage intrinsèquement motivés que ceux du secteur privé ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 81-99.
    2. Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2006. "Expériences de laboratoire en économie et incitations monétaires," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(3), pages 383-418.
    3. Preston, Anne E, 1989. "The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(4), pages 438-463, October.
    4. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    5. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    6. Adamchik, Vera A. & Bedi, Arjun S., 2000. "Wage differentials between the public and the private sectors: evidence from an economy in transition," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 203-224, March.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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