IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpi/wpaper/tax-mpg-rps-2014-15.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy

Author

Listed:
  • Anne-Kathrin Bronsert
  • Amihai Glazer
  • Kai A. Konrad

Abstract

A woman assessing the wealth of a potential husband may observe some, but not all, of his wealth. She may screen, leading to status consumption and wasteful gift giving. The screening activity is costly both for the potential husband, and for the woman, as it reduces the wealth of the man she may marry. A sound observable financial background (old money) benefits the candidate but also the woman, and reduces wasteful status consumption spending. Also, ageing and attractiveness of the woman affect the equilibrium conspicuous spending pattern.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne-Kathrin Bronsert & Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, 2014. "Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-15, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2014-15
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2014-15.pdf
    File Function: Full text (original version)
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, 2008. "A Signaling Explanation for Charity," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 713-722, Springer.
    2. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Bagnoli, Mark, 1993. "Courtship as a Waiting Game," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 185-202, February.
    3. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst & Nikolai Roussanov, 2009. "Conspicuous Consumption and Race," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(2), pages 425-467.
    4. Frank, Robert H, 1985. "The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 101-116, March.
    5. Ireland, Norman J., 1998. "Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-113, October.
    6. Omer Moav and & Zvika Neeman, 2012. "Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(563), pages 933-956, September.
    7. Yajin Wang & Vladas Griskevicius, 2014. "Conspicuous Consumption, Relationships, and Rivals: Women's Luxury Products as Signals to Other Women," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 40(5), pages 834-854.
    8. De Fraja, Gianni, 2009. "The origin of utility: Sexual selection and conspicuous consumption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 51-69, October.
    9. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
    10. Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1995. "Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 771-792, September.
    11. Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
    12. Hamermesh, Daniel S & Biddle, Jeff E, 1994. "Beauty and the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1174-1194, December.
    13. Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G, 1999. "Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages 307-334, June.
    14. Raymond Fisman & Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica & Itamar Simonson, 2006. "Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(2), pages 673-697.
    15. Ireland, Norman J., 1994. "On limiting the market for status signals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 91-110, January.
    16. Browning,Martin & Chiappori,Pierre-André & Weiss,Yoram, 2014. "Economics of the Family," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521795395, September.
    17. Corneo, Giacomo & Jeanne, Olivier, 1998. "Social organization, status, and savings behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 37-51, October.
    18. Tobias Thomas, 2013. "What price makes a good a status good? Results from a mating game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 35-55, August.
    19. Xiaofei Pan & Daniel Houser, 2011. "Mating Strategies and Gender Differences in Pro-sociality: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(4), pages 653-682, December.
    20. Corneo, Giacomo & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 55-71, October.
    21. Derek D. Rucker & Adam D. Galinsky, 2008. "Desire to Acquire: Powerlessness and Compensatory Consumption," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 35(2), pages 257-267, April.
    22. Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1987. "Diamonds Are a Government's Best Friend: Burden-Free Taxes on Goods Valued for Their Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 186-191, March.
    23. Jeffrey Dew & Joseph Price, 2011. "Beyond Employment and Income: The Association Between Young Adults’ Finances and Marital Timing," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 424-436, September.
    24. Ong, David & Wang, Jue, 2015. "Income attraction: An online dating field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 13-22.
    25. Lena Edlund, 2006. "Marriage: Past, Present, Future?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 52(4), pages 621-639, December.
    26. Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Bernheim, B Douglas, 1996. "Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 349-373, June.
    27. Ireland, N. J., 2001. "Optimal income tax in the presence of status effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 193-212, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anne-Kathrin Bronsert & Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, 2017. "Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 163-186, January.
    2. Bronsert, Anne-Kathrin & Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A., 2014. "Old Money, the Nouveau Riche and Brunhilde's Marriage Dilemma," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100385, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. König, Tobias & Lausen, Tobias, 2016. "Relative consumption preferences and public provision of private goods," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-213, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Perez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolas, 2007. "Conspicuous consumption in the land of Prince Charming," MPRA Paper 22009, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2010.
    5. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2019. "Wage inequality, labor income taxes, and the notion of social status," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 13, pages 1-35.
    6. Gurzki, Hannes & Woisetschläger, David M., 2017. "Mapping the luxury research landscape: A bibliometric citation analysis," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 147-166.
    7. Omer Moav and & Zvika Neeman, 2012. "Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(563), pages 933-956, September.
    8. Friedrichsen, Jana, 2016. "Signals sell: Designing a product line when consumers have social image concerns," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2012. "Redistribution and the notion of social status," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 651-657.
    10. Tran, Anh & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2012. "Rank as an inherent incentive: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 645-650.
    11. Mejía, Daniel & Restrepo, Pascual, 2016. "Crime and conspicuous consumption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 1-14.
    12. Friedrichsen, Jana, 2013. "Image concerns and the provision of quality," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-211, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    13. Mazali, Rogério & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2013. "Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 103-131.
    14. Friedrichsen, Jana, 2018. "Signals Sell: Product Lines when Consumers Differ Both in Taste for Quality and Image Concern," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 70, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    15. Kaus, Wolfhard, 2013. "Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 63-73.
    16. Sung-Ha HwangBy & Jungmin Lee, 2017. "Conspicuous consumption and income inequality," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 870-896.
    17. Frank Scott & Aaron Yelowitz, 2010. "Pricing Anomalies In The Market For Diamonds: Evidence Of Conformist Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 353-368, April.
    18. Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "Diaspora transferts et signal de richesse [Diaspora remittances and signaling wealth game]," MPRA Paper 57356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Tobias Thomas, 2013. "What price makes a good a status good? Results from a mating game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 35-55, August.
    20. Banuri, Sheheryar & Nguyen, Ha, 2023. "Borrowing to keep up (with the Joneses): Inequality, debt, and conspicuous consumption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 222-242.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; screening; search; conspicuous consumption; status;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2014-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Hans Mueller (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mptaxde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.