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Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills

Listed author(s):
  • Stefanie Brilon

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

This paper analyzes the job assignment problem faced by a firm when workers’ skills are distributed along several dimensions and jobs require different skills to varying extent. I derive optimal assignment rules with and without slot constraints, and show that under certain circumstances workers may get promoted although in their new job they are expected to be less productive than in their old job. This can be interpreted as a version of the Peter Principle which states that workers get promoted up to their level of incompetence.

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File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_25online.pdf
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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2010_25.

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Date of creation: May 2010
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_25
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  1. Jaime Ortega, 2001. "Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(10), pages 1361-1370, October.
  2. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R. & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2006. "Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 619-644, June.
  3. Eriksson, Tor & Ortega, Jaime, 2004. "The Adoption of Job Rotation: Testing the Theories," Working Papers 04-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Edward P. Lazear, 2004. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 141-163, February.
  5. Kate Antonovics & Limor Golan, "undated". "Experimentation and Job Choice," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E41, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  6. Dominique Demougin & Aloysius Siow, 1992. "Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 5, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  7. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," NBER Working Papers 9849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. I. Valsecchi, 1996. "Job Assignment and Promotion," Departmental Working Papers 1996-07, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  9. Joao Ricardo Faria, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the Peter and Dilbert Principles," Working Paper Series 101, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
  10. Jed DeVaro & Hodaka Morita, 2013. "Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 227-269.
  11. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-570, October.
  12. Christina Gathmann & Uta Schönberg, 2010. "How General Is Human Capital? A Task-Based Approach," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-49, 01.
  13. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Task-Specific Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 203-207, May.
  14. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 27-41, January.
  15. Sattinger, Michael, 1993. "Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 831-880, June.
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