Establishing a Hawkish Reputation: Interest Rate Setting by Newly Appointed Central Bank Governors
In this paper, we explore the interest rate setting behavior of newly appointed central bank governors. We use the Kuttner and Posen (2010) sample, which covers 15 OECD countries, and estimate an augmented Taylor (1993) rule for the period 1974–2008. We find, first, that newly appointed governors fight inflation more aggressively during the first four to eight quarters of their tenure in an effort to establish a reputation for being inflation averse. Second, we find a significantly stronger reaction to inflation by newly appointed governors working within monetary policy frameworks comprised of an at least partly independent central bank and an explicit nominal anchor.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg|
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael McMahon & Stephen Hansen, 2012.
"First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics,"
2012 Meeting Papers
1163, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Stephen Eliot Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2011. "First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics," Economics Working Papers 1279, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2011. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," Working Papers 572, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2011. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," CEP Discussion Papers dp1074, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2013. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 9607, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon, 2012. "First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics," CESifo Working Paper Series 3782, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kiviet, Jan F., 1995.
"On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic panel data models,"
Journal of Econometrics,
Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 53-78, July.
- Tom Doan, . "LSDVC: RATS procedure to estimate a dynamic FE model with correction for bias," Statistical Software Components RTS00111, Boston College Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201246. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.