Women’s preferences for social spending: theory and evidence from Spanish political representatives

This paper analyzes how the preferences of political representatives for social spending differ across gender groups, and what the effects of gender differences are for the equilibrium policies. We use a unique survey data from the CIS in Spain, comprising a sample of 350 male and 230 female political representatives of national chambers (Congress and Senate) and regional parliaments. Our findings suggest that, in general, female representatives have a stronger preference for social spending than male representatives. Interestingly, these gender differences arise within members of the right-wing party (of PP), whereas left-wing representatives (of PSOE) males and females, are more homogenous. In a comparison between national versus regional representatives, we find that within representatives of national chambers, women over men show on average, an additional probability of 25 percent points of self-reporting preferences for additional spending in education and pensions. However, within representative members of regional parliaments, gender differences in preferences are not statistically significant. We also provide a theoretical model, which serves us to understand the effects of gender party composition on the equilibrium policies. Our model reveals that gender quotas benefit right-wing parties. Intuitively, women provide moderation to rightist parties, which in turn produces electoral advantage.