When Banks Strategically React to Regulation: Market Concentration as a Moderator for Stability
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More about this item
KeywordsCapital Requirement Regulation; Competition; Financial Stabilityt;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-07-15 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-07-15 (Central Banking)
- NEP-COM-2013-07-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2013-07-15 (Regulation)
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