Underinvestment in public goods: The influence of state depended investment costs
In this paper we determine and analyze open loop and Markovian perfect equilibrium of a standard capital accumulation differential games, which is extended by a state depended cost function. As an application of the model we do consider knowledge accumulation or lobbying of firms with connected objectives. By using Pontryagin maximum principle and Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman equation, we find that the feedback strategies could be worse than open loop strategy, which is neither only due to ‘linearity’ as inWirl (1996, European Journal of Political Economy) nor only due to ’feedback information’ as Fershtman and Nitzan (1991, European Economic Review). Rather it is a mixed effect of these two.
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- A. Michael Spence, 1979. "Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991.
"Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1057-1067, July.
- Dockner, Engelbert J. & Van Long, Ngo & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Analysis of Nash equilibria in a class of capital accumulation games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(6-7), pages 1209-1235.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521637329 is not listed on IDEAS
- Wirl, Franz, 1996. "Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods: Extension to nonlinear strategies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 555-560, November.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
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