IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/dyngam/v3y2013i3p419-442.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Provision of Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • D. Yeung
  • L. Petrosyan

Abstract

The provision of public goods constitutes a classic case of market failure which calls for cooperative optimization. However, cooperation cannot be sustainable unless there is guarantee that the agreed-upon optimality principle can be maintained throughout the planning duration. This paper derives subgame consistent cooperative solutions for public goods provision by asymmetric agents with transferable payoffs in a stochastic differential game framework. In particular, subgame consistency ensures that as the game proceeds agents are guided by the same optimality principle, and hence they do not possess incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. A “payoff distribution procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and illustrative examples are presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with transferable payoffs is analyzed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • D. Yeung & L. Petrosyan, 2013. "Subgame Consistent Cooperative Provision of Public Goods," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 419-442, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:3:y:2013:i:3:p:419-442
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-012-0062-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-012-0062-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s13235-012-0062-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chamberlin, John, 1974. "Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 707-716, June.
    2. Fershtman, Chaim & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1057-1067, July.
    3. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    4. Wen-Kai Wang & Christian-Oliver Ewald, 2010. "Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods with uncertainty: a stochastic differential game model," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 33(2), pages 97-116, November.
    5. Wirl, Franz, 1996. "Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods: Extension to nonlinear strategies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 555-560, November.
    6. D. W. K. Yeung & L. A. Petrosyan, 2004. "Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solutions in Stochastic Differential Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 120(3), pages 651-666, March.
    7. D. W. K. Yeung, 2007. "Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 143-160, July.
    8. Martin McGuire, 1974. "Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-126, June.
    9. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tamai, Toshiki, 2018. "Dynamic provision of public goods under uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 409-415.
    2. Wen-Kai Wang & Christian-Oliver Ewald, 2010. "Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods with uncertainty: a stochastic differential game model," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 33(2), pages 97-116, November.
    3. Wang, Chengsi & Zudenkova, Galina, 2016. "Non-monotonic group-size effect in repeated provision of public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 116-128.
    4. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Van Long, Ngo, 2022. "A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    5. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Long, Ngo Van, 2019. "A Dynamic Analysis of Climate Change Mitigation with Endogenous Number of Contributors: Loose vs Tight Cooperation," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-92, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Arbel, Yuval & Bar-El, Ronen & Schwarz, Mordechai E. & Tobol, Yossef, 2014. "Voluntary Contributions to the Establishment and Operation of Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 8532, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Brunner, Eric & Sonstelie, Jon, 2003. "School finance reform and voluntary fiscal federalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2157-2185, September.
    8. Ihori, Toshihiro & Itaya, Jun-ichi, 2001. "A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 779-797, November.
    9. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 2000. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(2), pages 327-358.
    10. Ferrari, Giorgio & Riedel, Frank & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2016. "Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 485, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    11. Bård Harstad, 2016. "The Dynamics Of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 719-752, June.
    12. Debasis Mondal, 2015. "Private provision of public good and immiserizing growth," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 29-49, June.
    13. Engelbert Dockner & Florian Wagener, 2014. "Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 585-625, August.
    14. Benchekroun, Hassan & Long, Ngo Van, 2008. "The build-up of cooperative behavior among non-cooperative selfish agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 239-252, July.
    15. Sebastien Rouillon, 2018. "Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-24, September.
    16. Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 2007. "Voluntary Contributions To A Public Good: Non‐Neutrality Results," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 153-170, May.
    17. Todd Sandler, 2015. "Collective action: fifty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 195-216, September.
    18. Anja Brumme & Wolfgang Buchholz & Dirk Rübbelke, 2023. "The purity of impure public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 493-514, June.
    19. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2021. "Dynamic oligopoly pricing with reference-price effects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(3), pages 1006-1016.
    20. Matthew J. Kotchen, 2006. "Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 816-845, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:3:y:2013:i:3:p:419-442. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.