A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction
This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction by analysing the infinite duration dynamic game among various interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden. By comparing the first best solution, the open-loop solution under enforceable commitments, and the closed-loop solution without commitment, we explore the free riding aspect of fiscal reconstruction process and investigate the normative role of consumption taxes to internalize the free riding problem. We also derive explicitly the adjustment speeds of fiscal reconstruction under alternative solutions and examine the impact of consumption taxes on the adjustmet speed.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1997|
|Date of revision:|
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