The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation
Political economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a narrow elite controls political decisions, financial development may be deliberately obstructed to deny access to finance to potential competitors. This paper empirically examines whether the level of liberalisation of the banking system, the stock market and capital account depend on regime characteristics, using panel data from 26 countries from 1973 – 1999. Our results show that it is predominantly fully democratic regimes that have liberalised financial systems. Countries that are not fully democratic have a lower probability of having liberal banking systems and capital accounts and this probability decreases with increasing democratisation. This suggests that the attractiveness of using financial levers to allocate funds in the economy increases with the amount of competition the government faces, although a fully competitive electoral system creates incentives to relinquish financial control.
|Date of creation:||May 2005|
|Date of revision:||Oct 2005|
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- Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005.
"The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
- Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2001. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 1999. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CSEF Working Papers 29, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2005.
- Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2004.
"Finance, Inequality, and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
10979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Finance, inequality, and poverty: cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3338, The World Bank.
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