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The Role of Politics and Institutions in LDC Currency Devaluations

Listed author(s):
  • Anja Shortland

    ()

This paper examines political, institutional and economic determinants of exchange rate performance in less developed countries in the 1990s. It models exchange rate depreciations as two separate processes, firstly a process determining whether a currency is devalued and secondly a process determining the size of devaluation. The paper utilizes the most recent political and institutional data as well as a new index of central bank governor turnover in the 1990s to examine the relative importance of political and economic factors. While institutional and political factors dominate the probability of devaluation, the size of devaluations is mainly governed by economic factors.

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File URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp04-30.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 04/30.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:04/30
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Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK

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Fax: +44 (0)116 252 2908
Web page: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics
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